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Abstract: We examine geographical concentration, scientific quality, and editorial favoritism 
in the field of experimental economics. We use a novel data set containing all original research 
papers (𝑁 = 583) that exclusively used laboratory experiments for data generation and were 
published in the American Economic Review, Experimental Economics or the Journal of the 
European Economic Association between 1998 and 2018. The development of geographical 
concentration is examined using data on authors' affiliations at the time of the respective 
publication. Results show that research output produced by US-affiliated economists increased 
slower than overall research output, leading to a decrease in geographical concentration. 
Several proxies for scientific quality indicate that experiments conducted in Europe are of 
higher quality than experiments conducted in North America: European experiments rely on a 
larger total number of participants as well as participants per treatment, and receive more 
citations compared to experiments conducted in North America. Examining laboratory 
experiments published in the AER more closely, we find that papers authored by economists 
with US-affiliations receive significantly fewer citations in the first 5 and 10 years after 
publication compared to papers by authors from the rest of the world.  
 
JEL classification: A11, A14, C90, I23  
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standards, network effects 
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1 Introduction 
Several studies on publications in academic top journals show a dominant position of US 
research. It is an important question whether this dominance is the product of the sheer size of 
the US, of discrimination, or of other barriers to entry for researchers from the rest of the world. 
In the last decades, research on geographical and institutional concentration has received a lot 
of attention. For economic top journals, several studies show that a large but declining share of 
research is produced by US-based economists (Ek and Henrekson 2019, Glötzl and Aigner 
2017, Kocher and Sutter 2001, Kalaitzidakis et al. 1999, Hodgson and Rothman 1999, Elliott 
et al. 1998, Frey and Pommerehne 1988).  
In this paper, we focus on one particular field: experimental economics. Our analyses cover all 
laboratory experiments published between 1998 and 2018 in three important journals: the 
American Economic Review (AER), arguably one of the top journals for general economics 
worldwide, Experimental Economics (EE), the top field journal, and the Journal of the 
European Economic Association (JEEA), arguably the European top journal for general 
economics. 
Our first contribution is an analysis of geographical concentration. We examine its development 
using data on authors' affiliations at the time of publication. Similar to previous work, our 
analysis reveals that the US still has a dominant position, but also that US dominance has 
decreased over time. 
Our second contribution is an analysis of several proxies for the scientific quality of the 
published experiments. Drawing on the literature on experimental methods, we identify four 
proxies that are indicative of the quality of laboratory experiments and can be determined by 
the experimenters: the total number of participants, the number of participants per treatment, 
the number of treatments, and the strength of monetary incentives (measured as real 2015-USD 
per average participant-minute). To ensure comparability between experiments, we restrict our 
analyses to laboratory experiments and exclude all other types of experiments. 
Our results show substantial differences between Europe and North America, the two regions 
where more than 80% of the experiments were conducted. For all three journals, experiments 
conducted in Europe have a larger number of participants per treatment. In the AER and in EE, 
experiments conducted in Europe also have a larger total number of participants. We find no 
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differences in the strength of incentives. Hence, the (inflation-adjusted) total costs of 
experiments are higher for experiments conducted in Europe. 
Our third contribution is a test for whether the dominance of US-affiliated economists on the 
editorial board of the AER could give rise to editorial favoritism. Editorial favoritism can be a 
serious problem for scientific progress (Brogaard et al. 2014, Medoff 2003, Laband and Piette 
1994a). It arises when editorial decisions are not exclusively based on scientific criteria but also 
on non-scientific criteria, such as authors' institutional connections: if non-scientific criteria 
influence editorial decisions, colleagues with social ties to the members of a small elite of 
editors will find it "easier" to get their papers accepted. Such favoritism is a problem when the 
quality of published research suffers from it, i.e. when the editors’ buddies’ papers are published 
while better papers by no-names are rejected.  
Unlike the existing literature (Brogaard et al. 2014, Medoff 2003, Laband and Piette 1994a), 
our analysis of editorial favoritism clusters groups by geographical region (North America and 
Europe) and not by individual institution (e.g., university). As we have no data on submissions, 
we focus on published papers. With editorial favoritism present, we expect papers from authors 
without social ties to the editors to be of higher quality than papers from authors with social 
ties to the editors, at least on average.  
The number of participants and treatments, and the strength of monetary incentives constitute 
a set of ex ante proxies for quality that are available for editors when deciding about publication. 
However, originality, timeliness, and practical relevance are also strongly related to a paper's 
quality, but are not captured by our proxies for quality. Therefore, we use the number of 
citations that a paper received in the 5 and 10 years after publication as an ex post proxy for 
quality. Assuming that editors exclusively aim to maximize their journal's impact factor (which 
is debatable, but see Card and DellaVigna forthcoming), there should be no systematic 
difference in the quality of papers authored by economists with and without affiliations on the 
editorial board’s continent. However, this is not always the case. We find that AER papers     
(co-)authored by economists with a US affiliation receive, on average, fewer citations in the 5 
and 10 years following publication compared to papers by European authors published in the 
same outlet. We do not find this pattern for papers published in EE and the JEEA. This suggests 
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that the AER’s selection criteria fail to maximize the journal’s impact factor, or that editors 
pursue other goals1. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study in which the quality of laboratory 
experiments is compared across journals and geographical regions. By incorporating 
objectively measurable quality proxies into our analysis, we shed some light on the question of 
to what extent (differences in) citations are driven by (differences in) quality characteristics and 
social ties. In this respect, our analysis goes beyond the existing work on editorial favoritism. 
Surprisingly and despite the large differences in the total number of participants and participants 
per treatment, we find no robust evidence for any effect of these quality proxies on the number 
of citations. Yet, we are confident that our results provide insights for editors on how to improve 
their journals’ selection criteria and increase their journals' impact factors. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We start by reviewing the related literature 
in section 2. In section 3, we describe our data set and our selection criteria for journals and 
papers before we examine geographical concentration in section 4. In section 5, we compare 
the laboratory experiments conducted in Europe and North America using our proxies for 
quality. We describe our tests for editorial favoritism in section 6 and conclude in section 7. 
2  Related Literature 
2.1  Geographical Concentration 
Kalaitzidakis et al. (1999) look at ten high-quality journals from 1991 to 1996 and show that 
between 69% and 90% of all authors have an affiliation in North America. Based on all papers 
in the top 15 journals between 1977 and 1997, Kocher und Sutter (2001) find that 72.2% of 
these papers were authored by economists working in the US. They also find that US dominance 
reduced over time. Ek and Henrekson (2019) look at the top-five economics journals and show 
that between 82% (in 1994) and 65% (in 2017) of all authors have an affiliation in North 
America, and 95% of the North American authors have their affiliation in the US. Other studies 
                                                     
1 We decided to focus on editors and not on referees for three reasons. First, editors have the power to overrule 
referees' suggestions. Second, editors tend to select referees to whom they have easy access, implying that social 
ties between author and editor and between author and referee are correlated (Hamermesh 1994). And third, data 
on referees is hard to obtain. 
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find similar results regarding the decline in US dominance (Glötzl and Aigner 2017, Neary et 
al. 2003)2. For the field of laboratory experiments, we expect a similar pattern. 
2.2 Social Ties and Editorial Favoritism 
Editorial favoritism occurs when it is easier for an economist with a social tie to one or more 
editors to get her paper accepted, compared to a paper of the same quality submitted by an 
economist without such a social tie. Editorial favoritism might occur if, for example, editors 
favor their former PhD students, or authors employed at the same university or the same region3.  
A relatively high share of papers by authors who are connected to one of the journal's editors is 
often taken as an indication for editorial favoritism. However, this is neither necessary nor 
sufficient. As pointed out by Brogaard et al. (2014, 252), the decisive question is “…whether 
editors use information advantages to improve selection decisions, or whether they bow to 
conflicts of interest.” 
The earliest study on editorial favoritism in economics is Laband and Piette (1994a), who 
analyze all papers published in 28 journals in the year 1984. Laband and Piette define a social 
tie as one of the authors and one member of the editorial board having received their PhD from 
the same university or one of the authors and one member of the editorial board being affiliated 
with the same university in 1984. Controlling for papers’ length, journal quality, author's age, 
gender, and reputation, they find a positive correlation between the number of citations in the 
5 years after publication and the existence of a social tie. They note that some well-cited high-
quality papers mainly drive this positive correlation. However, their results also show that 
economists who had social ties to the editors authored more than two thirds of the papers with 
remarkably few citations. Thus, Laband and Piette find no clear evidence for or against editorial 
favoritism. Based on their results, they conclude that "on balance, journal editors use their 
professional connections to search out good papers, rather than print substandard material 
                                                     
2 US dominance can be observed not only among authors but also among editors. Hodgson and Rothman (1999, 
168 - 170) look at 30 high quality journals and show that more than 83% of all editorial board members come from 
the US. In section 6.1 we describe the composition of the editorial boards for the journals we examined. 
3 Discrimination implies that papers with a lower quality are accepted for publication, while papers with a higher 
quality are rejected. If the paper's true quality is somehow revealed after publication (possibly, by the number of 
citations), this might damage a journal's reputation (a loss in the journal's impact factor). So how can discrimination 
persist? It can persist as long as the true quality is not revealed, or if there is a form of collusion between editors 
of different journals, who all discriminate in the same way. In experimental oligopoly markets it has been found 
that a shrinking market facilitates collusion (Abbink and Brandts 2009). In economics we have a similar situation. 
As more and more journals are published in English but outside the US (e.g., the JEEA), the US-market is 
shrinking. However, rather than investigating discrimination over time, we focus on the possible existence of 
discrimination in one particular field. 
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written by their colleagues or buddies" (Laband and Piette 1994a, 200). Medoff (2003) analyzes 
all papers published in six core journals in 1990 and also finds that papers by authors with a 
social tie to the editors or co-editors receive a higher number of citations in the years following 
publication. He examines the citations received in the 5 and 10 years after publication and 
observes that the positive effect of social ties is stable over time. 
More recently, several papers have examined further effects of social ties. Based on an analysis 
of 50,000 articles in 30 major economics and finance journals since 1955, Brogaard et al. (2014) 
show that the publication rates of authors in these journals increase by 100% as soon as one of 
their current colleagues is the editor in charge of the corresponding journal. Their results show 
that articles by authors with social ties to editors receive significantly more citations than 
articles by authors without such connections. Colussi (2018) analyzes all 1,620 papers 
published in four top-journals (AER, Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy (JPE), 
Quarterly Journal of Economics (QJE)) between 2000 and 2006. Colussi’s results show that 
editors are more likely to accept papers from colleagues (an 8% increase at the baseline) and 
former PhD students (a 14% increase at the baseline). Further, he shows that about 43% of all 
papers were written by an author connected to at least one editor in charge of the journal at the 
time of publication. However, since the base-rate of submitting authors is unknown, this value 
is difficult to interpret. Heckman (2017) finds a similar pattern in two house journals, the 
University of Chicago's JPE and Harvard's QJE. Using data on publications from 2000 to 2016, 
he shows that 14.3% of all papers in the JPE come from authors affiliated with the University 
of Chicago, and that 24.7% of all publications in the QJE come from authors affiliated with 
Harvard.  
Taken together, thus, previous studies suggest that (1) social ties can improve the chances of 
getting published because they reduce editors’ search costs for high-quality papers, and (2) that 
conditional on being accepted for publication, on balance, papers from authors with social ties 
receive more citations. None of the studies finds clear evidence for editorial favoritism (but see 
Shepherd, 1995, for anecdotal evidence). 
The studies discussed above focus on editorial favoritism and the effects of social ties. They 
discuss social ties exclusively at the institutional level but not at the regional level. As Frey and 
Pommerehne (1988, 106-107) point out, it may also be generally possible that it is easier for 
American economists to publish in American-dominated journals than it is for non-American 
economists. 
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Existing studies on editorial favoritism (Laband and Piette 1994a, Medoff 2003) use data on 
individual authors (e.g., affiliations, age, gender, reputation) and characteristics of the 
papers (e.g., length, JEL code, position within the journal issue). These characteristics, 
however, are not related to any methodological standards. In section 5.1, we argue that there 
are four proxies that capture different methodological standards for laboratory experiments. 
Our analysis of editorial favoritism for laboratory experiments includes these four proxies, and 
thus extends the existing literature on editorial favoritism. 
3 Data on Laboratory Experiments 
3.1 Selection Criteria 
Although we are interested in the overall development of experimental economics, we decided 
to focus exclusively on papers that report results from laboratory experiments. Precisely, we 
focus on laboratory experiments that generate data in a controlled process using student 
participants who interact in an artificial environment4. In order to ensure the greatest possible 
comparability, we do not consider papers that contain other types of experiments5. 
For laboratory experiments, objectively measurable proxies for an experiment’s quality exist. 
This is because, compared to field experiments, laboratory experiments have the exclusive 
advantage that the experimenter has a high degree of control. Proxies for an experiment's quality 
are the total number of participants, the number of treatments, the number of participants per 
treatment, and the strength of incentives. We describe these proxies in more detail in section 
5.1.  
There is no doubt that field experiments play an important role in experimental economics (for 
a detailed discussion see, Czibor et al. 2019, Carpenter et al. 2005, Harrison and List 2004). 
However, in field experiments at least one of our quality proxies cannot be controlled. For 
example, an artefactual field (or lab-in-the-field) experiment relies on a population of 
participants specifically selected for a given research question (e.g., chess players in Levitt et 
al. 2011) that cannot be fully controlled by the experimenter. Similarly, framed field 
experiments take place in a natural environment (e.g., the National Rural Support Programme 
Offices in Afzal et al. 2017) which also cannot be fully controlled by the experimenter. In 
                                                     
4 Our data contain papers where the majority of the participants were students. Papers where the majority of 
participants belonged to special groups (such as job professionals or caste members) are not included in the data 
set. 
5 For example, the AER paper by Imas (2016) is not included in our data set because the paper contains two 
laboratory experiments and a robustness check conducted online via Amazon M-Turk. 
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natural field experiments, moreover, both the participant population and the environment 
cannot be controlled exogenously. 
3.2 Our Data Set 
Our data set contains 583 papers published between 1998 and 2018 (410 from EE, 135 from 
the AER (including papers from AER’s Papers and Proceedings) and 38 from the JEEA)6. We 
chose 1998 as the starting year for our analysis because EE was founded that year. EE is the 
specialized field journal of the Economic Science Association. It publishes laboratory and field 
experiments as well as related theoretical papers and reviews. We chose the AER and the JEEA 
because they are the official journals of the American Economic Association and the European 
Economic Association, respectively. Both are general interest journals and publish only a small 
share of laboratory experiments7. We have decided to collect data from these relatively high 
ranked journals to ensure that the individual papers have received a certain number of citations 
and because we assume that the journals receive a high number of submissions from different 
geographical regions. 
For each paper in our data set, we collected data on: 
 the authors and their affiliations at the time of publication, 
 the number of citations received by the individual authors in the 5 years before 
publication, 
 the total number of pages, 
 the total number of references, 
 the journal's impact factors in the year the paper was published, and  
 the paper's number of citations in the 5 and 10 years after publication. 
In addition, we extracted data on the characteristics of the laboratory experiments reported in 
the papers. If available, for each laboratory experiment we collected data on: 
 the total number of participants, 
 the number of treatments, 
 the duration of the experiment, 
                                                     
6 A full list of the included papers can be found in the supplementary material. 
7 On the IDEAS/RePEc Simple Impact Factors for Journals list the AER is ranked 10th, the JEEA is ranked 19th 
and EE is ranked 35th (see https://ideas.repec.org/top/top.journals.simple.html, accessed August 29 2019). On the 
latest version of the Journal Quality List of Anne-Wil Harzing, which provides an overview of several different 
ratings, the AER is rated A+ and the JEEA and EE are both rated A (see 
https://harzing.com/download/jql_title_2019-02.pdf, accessed August 29 2019). 
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 average earnings per participant, and 
 the year in which the experiment was conducted. 
Citation data was obtained from Web of Science. Data on impact factors were taken from CitEc, 
a RePEc service that provides citation data for economics8.  All other data were obtained 
directly from the published papers. As not all papers report data on all characteristics, our data 
set contains some papers for which some or all of the experiment's characteristics are missing. 
In case of missing values, we tried to obtain the data from working paper versions or directly 
from the authors, which was successful in some cases. 
4 Geographical Concentration in Experimental Economics 
In this section, we examine the geographical concentration of published laboratory experiments 
at the country-level. In section 4.1, we look at the country shares for each journal for the longest 
available period. In section 4.2, we examine how geographical concentration has changed over 
time. 
We measure geographical concentration as follows (see also Combes and Linnemer 2003, 
Kocher und Sutter 2001). Let 𝐼𝐹𝑖 be the 2-year impact factor of the journal in which paper 𝑖 
was published in the year the paper was published. Let 𝑛𝑖 be the number of authors of paper 𝑖. 
An author's weight is then given by 𝐼𝐹𝑖/𝑛𝑖. The weighted score for a single country and a given 
time period is calculated by aggregating the values of all authors whose affiliated institution 
was located in this country (at the time of publication). Given the weighted scores of all 
countries, we compute each country's share. 
4.1 Pooled Over Time 
Table 1 shows the shares for selected countries9. The first three columns depict the results by 
journal, the last column presents the aggregate results for laboratory experiments published in 
all three journals. Appendix Table 14 lists all countries' scores and shares by journal. Our results 
are qualitatively similar if we do not weight individual papers by the journal's impact factor, so 
that each author's weight is given by 1/𝑛𝑖. 
                                                     
8 For the AER see, http://citec.repec.org/s/2018/aeaaecrev.html, for EE see, 
http://citec.repec.org/s/2018/kapexpeco.html and for the JEEA see, http://citec.repec.org/s/2018/blajeurec.html 
(accessed July 9, 2019). Data for Experimental Economics' impact factor for 1998 and for the JEEA's impact 
factor before 2011 was not available. 
9 We have assigned Israel, Russia and Turkey to Europe and Guatemala and Mexico to North America throughout 
the whole paper. 
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Shares 
AER EE JEEA all three 
Austria 2.81 4.86 0.00 3.73 
France 0.69 3.03 3.28 2.28 
Germany 4.35 12.08 11.62 9.47 
Israel 1.59 0.84 0.00 1.01 
Italy 0.42 3.50 1.73 2.31 
Netherlands 3.15 4.68 8.21 4.50 
Norway 0.58 0.68 7.05 1.24 
Spain 2.87 5.88 2.28 4.55 
Sweden 0.76 1.25 0.00 0.97 
Switzerland 5.36 2.24 17.86 4.73 
UK 5.79 8.80 10.61 7.97 
Other European countries 0.83 1.89 0.00 1.36 
Europe 29.20 49.73 62.64 44.11 
US 62.51 37.84 29.10 45.22 
Other North American countries 1.62 3.06 1.71 2.46 
North America 64.13 40.90 30.81 47.68 
Australia and NZ 2.58 4.99 2.32 3.94 
Asia 3.56 4.09 2.96 3.81 
South America 0.54 0.29 1.28 0.46 
Other continents 6.67 9.37 6.55 8.21 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Table 1: Geographical concentration, countries' relative shares for selected countries, pooled data from 1998 to 
2018 for the AER, from 1999 to 2018 for EE and from 2011 to 2018 for the JEEA. Continents are marked in bold. 
We see that US economists are dominant in all journals. For the AER this dominance is most 
pronounced. When looking at the European countries, Germany, the UK, Switzerland, Spain, 
the Netherlands, and Austria stick out because they have the highest outputs within Europe. 
4.2 Development Over Time 
Looking at development over time, we divide the 20-year period from 1999 to 2018 into four 
five-year periods10. Table 2 shows the scores and shares of all countries with a share larger than 
1% (for the whole period from 1999 to 2018). Scores and shares of all countries can be found 
in appendix Table 15. The analyses in Table 2 and Table 15 only contain data on papers from 
the AER and EE, as CitEc impact factors for the JEEA are available only for 2011-2018. 
The first result that sticks out is the sharp increase in the field's research output. Looking at the 
total output by aggregating scores over all countries (Table 2 and appendix Table 15), we see 
an increase from 105.85 (1999-2003) to 279.14 (2004-2008) to 584.54 (2009-2013) followed 
by a decrease to 416.92 (2014-2018). The decrease in the most recent period could be due to 
                                                     
10 We exclude observations from 1998, as CitEc impact factors for EE are only available from 1999 onward. 
11 
 
four reasons: First, field and online experiments have developed into an increasingly established 
research method in recent years (see e.g., Stewart et al. 2015), partially replacing lab 
experiments. Second, a larger fraction of papers use multiple methods for data collection. These 
papers are not included in our data set. Third, other journals have become more open toward 
laboratory experiments or new journals that publish laboratory experiments have been 
established. And fourth, editors' tastes may have changed so that other research methods are 
preferred to laboratory experiments. 
Based on the scores (appendix Table 15), we computed compound growth rates. Aggregated 
over all countries, the field's research output increased by 57.93% from each five-year period 
to the next. As expected, the compound growth rate for US-economists is much smaller 
(30.64%). High growth rates are observed for Australia (211%), Austria (192%), Italy (157%), 
China (133%), Germany (118%), the UK (114%), the Netherlands (110%) and Japan (100%). 
Of course, these growth rates are partly due to the fact that some countries started from very 
low levels of research output in the period 1999-2003. 
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Shares 
Scores 
1999-2003 2004-2008 2009-2013 2014-2018 1999-2018 
Austria 0.63 0.12 6.79 3.99 4.09 
  0.67 0.34 39.71 16.63 57.34 
France 3.01 0.20 2.61 2.72 2.16 
  3.18 0.55 15.27 11.33 30.33 
Germany 4.78 5.53 9.56 12.63 9.22 
  5.06 15.43 55.91 52.66 129.38 
Israel 1.07 0.78 1.79 0.44 1.18 
  1.13 2.18 10.44 1.82 16.58 
Italy 0.61 1.23 3.06 2.66 2.40 
  0.65 3.44 17.91 11.09 33.60 
Netherlands 2.32 4.20 3.49 5.49 4.10 
  2.46 11.73 20.40 22.88 57.48 
Spain 1.70 2.81 8.46 1.82 4.78 
  1.80 7.85 49.46 7.59 67.02 
Sweden 1.01 1.70 0.23 1.86 1.07 
  1.07 4.74 1.37 7.76 14.95 
Switzerland 9.19 1.30 4.49 1.83 3.37 
  9.72 3.64 26.24 7.64 47.24 
UK 3.07 6.53 9.23 7.69 7.77 
  3.25 18.24 53.93 32.08 109.00 
Other Euro. countries 1.79 1.79 1.19 3.84 2.13 
 1.89 5.01 6.95 16.01 29.86 
Europe 29.18 26.21 50.91 44.97 42.26 
 30.89 73.16 297.59 187.49 592.79 
US 65.07 68.47 39.68 36.83 46.85 
  68.87 191.12 231.94 153.56 657.18 
Other NA countries 1.58 0.88 2.92 3.39 2.54 
 1.68 2.46 17.08 14.14 35.69 
North America 66.65 69.35 42.60 40.22 49.40 
  70.55 193.58 249.02 167.70 692.87 
Australia and NZ 2.34 1.57 4.59 5.67 4.09 
 2.48 4.39 26.84 23.63 57.33 
Asia 1.83 2.87 1.79 8.03 3.87 
 1.94 8.01 10.45 33.47 54.33 
South America 0.00 0.00 0.11 1.11 0.38 
 0.00 0.00 0.64 4.63 5.27 
Other continents 4.17 4.44 6.49 14.81 8.34 
 4.42 12.40 37.93 61.73 116.93 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 105.85 279.14 584.54 416.92 1402.61 
Table 2: Shares and scores for the geographical concentration of AER and EE authors for selected countries. 
Data pooled over different periods. For each country, the first row reports the country's share and the second row 
reports the country's score. 
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Looking at countries' relative shares (the upper row of each country in Table 2), we find that 
the US-dominance decreased from about 65.07% (1999-2003) to 36.83% (2014-2018) while 
several countries increased their relative shares. The countries that gained most are Germany 
(7.85%), the UK (4.62%), Australia (4.43%), and the Netherlands (3.16%). All this shows that 
geographical concentration has decreased. Indeed, this is confirmed if we look at the Herfindahl 
index11, which first increased from 0.332 (1999-2003) to 0.480 (2004-2008) but then decreased 
to 0.169 (2009-2013) and to 0.171 (2014-2018). In sum, our data show that for laboratory 
experimental economics, the geographical concentration of AER and EE authors has 
substantially decreased. 
The discussion above focused on the development of impact-weighted research output. Note 
that we looked at output (i.e., published papers) without considering inputs (e.g., manpower, 
financial resources). Hence, we cannot say anything about a country's productivity. Because 
input data comparable across countries is not available, we follow Kocher and Sutter (2001) in 
using a country's population as proxy and compute each country's output per million inhabitants 
in appendix Table 16 and Table 1712. 
Considering the first time period (1999-2003, see Table 16), we see that output per million 
inhabitants was below 0.2, except for Switzerland (1.36), New Zealand (0.46) and the US 
(0.25). Considering only the last period (2014-2018, see Table 17), we see that output was 
above 0.40 for several countries (Australia 0.90, Germany 0.65, Spain 0.60, UK 0.50, US 0.48) 
and we see some very high productivities in small countries (Austria 1.95, Singapore 1.40, the 
Netherlands 1.36, Norway 1.17, Switzerland 0.93, Denmark 0.83, Sweden 0.80, New Zealand 
0.53). 
Interestingly, there are some differences between our results and the results reported in Kocher 
and Sutter (2001, 414). They show that Israel has the highest and the US have the second-
highest productivity. UK ranks third, Switzerland ranks 9th, Germany ranks 17th and Spain 
ranks 19th. Recall that while Kocher and Sutter consider papers from all areas, we focus on 
                                                     
11 The Herfindahl index is the sum of all countries' squared market shares. For a monopoly, the index is equal to 
one. Smaller numbers indicate less concentration. 
12 This approach only gives a crude picture and has several shortcomings (c.f. Kocher and Sutter 2001, 414). It 
implicitly assumes that resources devoted to experimental economics is highly correlated with a country's 
inhabitants, which is problematic especially in large less-developed countries. Data for population sizes was taken 
from the World Bank (see, https://databank.worldbank.org/data/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL/1ff4a498/Popular-
Indicators, accessed May 22, 2019) and for Taiwan from the UN (see, 
https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/, accessed May 22, 2019). To compute scores per 
million inhabitants for a specific time period we used the population size for the period's first year (e.g., 1999 
population for the period 1999-2003). 
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laboratory experimental economics. In addition, Kocher and Sutter consider data until 1997 
while our data on geographical concentration start in 1999. Because of the different time periods 
and our specialization on one particular field, the results are not directly comparable, but a 
tentative explanation for the differences is that several European countries (Switzerland, 
Austria, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands) have specialized in experimental economics. 
5 Quality Characteristics 
In the preceding section, we described the development of geographical concentration by 
looking at the number of publications weighted by the journals' impact factor. Such an analysis 
neglects any differences between individual papers published within the same journal in a given 
year. If there are significant quality differences between different papers published in the same 
journal in a given year, the results from the preceding section could be biased. By focusing on 
the characteristics of individual experiments and papers, we try to uncover such differences in 
order to get a more detailed picture. 
In subsection 5.1, we describe four proxies for the quality of laboratory experiments. We 
compare these proxies in subsection 5.2. This comparison reveals that there are differences 
regarding methodological standards between experiments conducted in North America and 
Europe. In subsection 5.3, we describe three proxies for the quality of papers that report 
experimental results. All seven proxies are available prior to publication and might inform 
editors' decisions. This is not the case for the number of citations a paper receives after 
publication, which we argue to be the most important ex post quality proxy in subsection 5.4. 
Finally, we compare the number of citations between experiments conducted in North America 
and Europe in subsection 5.5. 
5.1 Proxies for the Quality of Laboratory Experiments 
Our proxies for the quality of an experiment (shorthand: P1-P4) are objectively measurable. 
However, they are only proxies. Thus, it is possible that they only weakly correlate with the 
true quality of an experiment, which is of course unknown. 
(P1 and P2) The first two quality proxies are the total number of participants, and the number 
of participants per treatment. Both are related to the experiment's statistical power. For a more 
detailed discussion of power analysis in experimental economics see Czibor et al. (2019), 
Ioannidis et al. (2017), Bellemare et al. (2016, 2014) and Zhang and Ortmann (2013). 
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Experiments with higher power tend to generate fewer false positives and, hence, their results 
are more likely to replicate. This in turn could increase confidence in the experiment's results13. 
For a given number of treatments, a larger total number of participants results in more 
observations, which increases statistical power if statistical testing is carried out at the 
participant-level. A similar proxy for quality is the number of participants per treatment. If an 
experiment contains a large number of treatments, and if the statistical analysis involves a 
pairwise comparison of treatments, the number of participants per treatment is a better proxy 
for the experiment's power.  
Arguably, another possibility would be using the number of independent observations as a 
proxy for quality. Since the question of what constitutes an independent observation has no 
clear answer, we did not follow this route (see chapter 3 in Svorenčík and Maas 2016). Another, 
but related, aspect concerns the possibility to econometrically control for dependencies (see 
Moffatt 2015, 5-6). If dependencies are controlled for, the number of independent observations 
will underestimate the quality of the experiment14. 
(P3) The third proxy is the number of treatments. Ceteris paribus, a larger number of treatments 
increases quality because it allows to test for more alternative explanations. By testing for a 
higher number of alternative explanations, authors increase the scientific value of their papers 
by linking the interpretation of their results to a larger number of existing papers and 
corroborating their claims better by ruling out more alternative hypotheses. 
(P4) The fourth proxy is the strength of monetary incentives. According to the methodological 
literature on laboratory experiments, monetary incentives are related to the quality of an 
experiment. In fact, the use of monetary incentives is an established methodological standard 
in economics (see Hertwig and Ortmann 2001, 390) and all experiments in our data set use 
monetary incentives. Possibly, this is the case because experimental economists expect that 
they cannot publish their paper if they would use hypothetical rather than monetary incentives 
                                                     
13 Camerer at al. (2016) were able to successfully replicate the results of 11 out of 18 experiments. With the goal 
of making replication studies more attractive, Drazen et al. (2019) suggest journal-based replication, in which the 
journal contracts a replication after a paper has been accepted but before it is published. 
14 For example, consider a T-times repeated public good game with stranger matching. Assume the experiment 
consists of two treatments, S sessions per treatment, and N participants per treatment. Due to the stranger matching 
protocol, all observations within the same sessions are dependent. The most conservative way would be to take a 
session's average contribution (pooled across participants and time) as one independent observation and compare 
session averages across treatments. Proceeding this way, we would have S independent observations per treatment. 
If we would exploit the panel structure of the data and use a random effects model, we could use each single 
decision as an observation resulting in a total of 2STN observations. 
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(Camerer and Hogarth 1999, 31)15. We operationalized the strength of monetary incentives by 
dividing a participant's average earnings (including the show-up fee) by the duration of the 
experiment (in minutes) and converting the result into real 2015 US-Dollars16. 
Regarding the strength of monetary incentives, Davis and Holt (1993, 24-25) argue that 
incentives should be high enough to cover opportunity costs. This rule defines a lower limit for 
incentives but remains silent about the relation between the strength of incentives and behavior. 
Camerer and Hogarth (1999, 31) show that the strength of monetary incentives affects behavior 
and increases data quality. With stronger incentives, subjects are less likely to show thoughtless 
behavior or make errors, leading to lower variance and less noise in the data. This, in turn, leads 
to an increase in power, allows for more precise statistical testing, and increases the likelihood 
of successful replication. According to this line of reasoning, experimental economists could 
increase the quality of their experiments by paying higher rewards17. 
Table 3 gives an overview of mean values for the quality proxies for the three journals. At first 
glance, we see that total number of participants, number of participants per treatment and 
number of treatments are higher for the AER and the JEEA than for EE. As Table 3 illustrates, 
the variable strength of monetary incentives could only be computed for 53% of AER papers, 
72% of EE papers and 63% of JEEA papers. This is because, even in these prestigious journals, 
many papers do not report the number of participants, average earnings per participant, or the 
duration of the experiment. 
  
                                                     
15 For a more detailed discussion of monetary incentives see Bardsley et al. (chapter 6, 2010), Ortmann (2009), 
Read (2005), Guala (chapter 11, 2005) and Rydval and Ortmann (2004).  
16 Data for exchange rates comes from fxtop.com. Data for CPI comes from https://data.oecd.org. In some papers 
it was not stated, in which year the experiment was conducted. In these cases we estimated the corresponding value 
by subtracting three years from the year of publication. 
17 A related aspect that is discussed by Camerer and Hogarth (1999) concerns participants' cognitive abilities. 
Together with monetary incentives and intrinsic motivation, cognitive abilities affect participants' mental effort. 
However, the effect from incentives on mental effort is likely to be non-monotonic, as recognized by Davis and 
Holt: "No amount of money can motivate participants to perform a calculation beyond their intellectual capacities, 
any more than generous bonuses would transform most of us into professional athletes" (Davis and Holt 1993, 
24). Because no data on participants' cognitive abilities are available, we could not include cognitive abilities in 
our set of quality proxies. We believe that this is unproblematic because there is no reason to expect any systematic 
differences in participants' cognitive abilities across experiments. 
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 AER 
𝑁 = 135 
EE 
𝑁 = 410 
JEEA 
𝑁 = 38 
P1: total # of participants 255.93 
(203.37) 
𝑁 = 128 
194.49 
(128.45) 
𝑁 = 407 
289.65 
(183.78) 
𝑁 = 37 
P2: # participants per treatment 69.39 
(90.00) 
𝑁 = 126 
55.33 
(40.97) 
𝑁 = 405 
61.50 
(43.44) 
𝑁 = 31 
P3: # treatments 4.40 
(3.01) 
𝑁 = 133 
3.90 
(2.29) 
𝑁 = 407 
4.84 
(2.50) 
𝑁 = 32 
P4: strength of monetary incentives 0.40 
(0.24) 
𝑁 = 72 
0.31 
(0.14) 
𝑁 = 294 
0.32 
(0.16) 
𝑁 = 24 
Table 3: Mean values, standard deviations (in parentheses) and number of observations for experiments' proxies. 
5.2 Are there Differences in Methodological Standards? 
In this subsection, we examine whether there are clearly defined methodological standards with 
regard to the ex ante proxies for quality described above. If this were the case, one would expect 
to find no differences regarding these proxies between experiments conducted in different 
regions. 
In the following, we look only at laboratory experiments conducted in North America or 
Europe. More than 82% of the papers in our dataset contain laboratory experiments conducted 
in these two regions. 
P1: total # 
participants  
North America Europe both regions p-value 
AER 220.16 
(170.85) 
𝑁 = 69 
368.49 
(257.87) 
𝑁 = 37 
271.93 
(216.22) 
𝑁 = 106 
0.0004 
EE 167.03 
(94.83) 
𝑁 = 164 
204.93 
(126.44) 
𝑁 = 169 
186.27 
(113.42) 
𝑁 = 333 
0.0078 
JEEA 246.92 
(121.16) 
𝑁 = 13 
301.81 
(221.31) 
𝑁 = 21 
280.82 
(189.09) 
𝑁 = 34 
0.9294 
all three  186.15 
(124.78) 
𝑁 = 246 
240.56 
(175.46) 
𝑁 = 227 
212.26 
(153.51) 
𝑁 = 473 
0.0003 
Table 4: Mean values, standard deviations (in parentheses) and number of observations for total number of 
participants by region and journal. Last column is the p-value from a two-sided Mann-Whitney test. 
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P2:  # 
participants 
per 
treatment  
North America Europe both regions p-value 
AER 54.78 
(45.74) 
𝑁 = 68 
111.26 
(146.45) 
𝑁 = 37 
74.68 
(97.50) 
𝑁 = 105 
0.0001 
EE 49.07 
(33.96) 
𝑁 = 163 
59.97 
(40.76) 
𝑁 = 168 
54.60 
(37.91) 
𝑁 = 331 
0.0031 
JEEA 37.69 
(19.22) 
𝑁 = 10 
73.10 
(49.63) 
𝑁 = 19 
60.89 
(44.68) 
𝑁 = 29 
0.0276 
all three  50.21 
(37.28) 
𝑁 = 241 
69.56 
(72.56) 
𝑁 = 224 
59.53 
(57.82) 
𝑁 = 465 
<0.0001 
Table 5: Mean values, standard deviations (in parentheses) and number of observations for participants per 
treatment by region and journal. Last column is the p-value from a two-sided Mann-Whitney test. 
P3: # 
treatments  
North America Europe both regions p-value 
AER 4.30 
(2.96) 
3 
𝑁 = 73 
4.79 
(3.47) 
4 
𝑁 = 38 
4.47 
(3.13) 
3 
𝑁 = 111 
0.5527 
EE 3.92 
(2.30) 
4 
𝑁 = 165 
3.79 
(2.34) 
4 
𝑁 = 168 
3.85 
(2.31) 
4 
𝑁 = 333 
0.4391 
JEEA 5.00 
(3.16) 
2 
𝑁 = 11 
4.63 
(2.14) 
3 
𝑁 = 19 
4.77 
(2.51) 
3 & 4 
𝑁 = 30 
0.9479 
all three 4.08 
(2.55) 
4 
𝑁 = 249 
4.03 
(2.57) 
4 
𝑁 = 225 
4.05 
(2.56) 
4 
𝑁 = 474 
0.7020 
Table 6: Mean values, standard deviations (in parentheses), modes and number of observations for number of 
treatments by region and journal. Last column is the p-value from a two-sided Mann-Whitney test. 
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P4: strength of 
monetary  incentives  
North America Europe both regions p-value 
AER 0.37 
(0.17) 
𝑁 = 35 
0.45 
(0.32) 
𝑁 = 29 
0.41 
(0.25) 
𝑁 = 64 
0.2544 
EE 0.30 
(0.12) 
𝑁 = 116 
0.33 
(0.16) 
𝑁 = 131 
0.32 
(0.14) 
𝑁 = 247 
0.0791 
JEEA 0.33 
(0.14) 
𝑁 = 6 
0.32 
(0.17) 
𝑁 = 16 
0.32 
(0.16) 
𝑁 = 22 
0.8828 
all three 0.32 
(0.14) 
𝑁 = 157 
0.35 
(0.20) 
𝑁 = 176 
0.33 
(0.17) 
𝑁 = 333 
0.0693 
Table 7: Mean values, standard deviations (in parentheses) and number of observations for strength of monetary 
incentives by region and journal. Last column is the p-value from a two-sided Mann-Whitney test. 
Table 4 to Table 7 show the mean values of the ex ante proxies for quality by journal and region. 
With respect to the total number of participants or the number of participants per treatment, 
there seems to be no universal methodological standard. Rather, there seem to be systematic 
differences between experiments conducted in both regions. 
Except for the JEEA, experiments conducted in Europe involve a significantly larger total 
number of participants. For all journals, European experiments have a significantly larger 
number of participants per treatment. Possibly, these differences indicate differences with 
regard to what constitutes an independent observation, as emphasized by Frans van Winden: 
"I can remember at the Amsterdam meetings that there were some heated discussions, 
and they were related to three topics. First of all, what is an independent observation? 
What I remember is that people from the United States were more liberal in the sense 
that they applied parametric statistics whereas the Germans, especially of course 
Reinhard Selten and the group he influenced, were stricter on that."  
(Frans van Winden, cited in Svorenčík and Maas 2016, 188-198). 
Another possible explanation for the differences in the total number of participants and the 
number of participants per treatment (P1 and P2) is that there are differences in the types of 
experiments conducted in the two regions (e.g., individual decision making, public good games, 
market experiments...) that require different numbers of participants. If there are systematic 
differences in the distribution of types, our measures P1 and P2 will be biased. A cursory look 
into our data reveals that for almost all types the number of participants is higher for 
experiments conducted in Europe, indicating that it is unlikely that our results are driven by 
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differences in types. However, while some experiments can be easily classified as certain types, 
there are many experiments that are hard to classify. 
With regard to the number of treatments, there are no significant differences between North-
American and European experiments. Across journals and continents, the mode of treatments 
per experiment is four. 
Regarding the strength of monetary incentives there also are no significant differences. This 
observation is compatible with the existence of a common standard for how to incentivize 
participants in Europe and North America. 
Our results for the total number of participants and the strength of monetary incentives could 
suggest that experimental economists from Europe have to pay a higher price for publishing 
their papers, compared to experimental economists from North America. Another explanation 
might be that economists in Europe have easier access to research funding compared to their 
colleagues in the US18. 
The differences in the total number of participants could be driven by a cohort effect. Section 
4.2 showed that the US’s research output was very high in the first two periods before it 
decreased. If the total number of participants increases over time, and if this increase has the 
same magnitude for experiments conducted in North America and Europe, the differences in 
the total number of participants in Table 4 would only reflect the fact that the share of 
experiments conducted in the US decreased. To rule out such cohort effects, we look at the total 
number of participants for four periods. Table 8 shows that there are almost no significant 
differences in the total number of participants for the first and second period. However, from 
the periods 2009-2013 and 2014-2018, the total number of participants for European 
experiments for both journals is always higher and in most cases the difference is statistically 
significant. Moreover, the difference between North America and Europe increases over time. 
This suggests that the differences in the total number of participants for the pooled data (1999-
2018) are not driven by the decreasing share of US output. Rather, it is driven by differences in 
the total number of participants in the two most recent periods. 
  
                                                     
18 We thank Gary Charness for drawing our attention to this aspect. Unfortunately, there are no sources for the 
amount of research funding for experimental economists in different regions. However, we consider it unlikely 
that there is a causal relationship between the availability of research funding and the average total number of 
participants. Even if research funds were easier available in Europe, they could be used, for example, to carry out 
more single projects. 
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period P1: total number of 
participants 
North 
America 
Europe both regions p-value 
1
9
9
9
 -
 2
0
0
3
 
AER 240.65 
(163.21) 
𝑁 = 20 
230.00 
(124.78) 
𝑁 = 10 
237.10 
(149.37) 
𝑁 = 30 
0.9140 
EE 134.15 
(75.65) 
𝑁 = 41 
154.85 
(99.97) 
𝑁 = 34 
143.53 
(87.51) 
𝑁 = 75 
0.3522 
both 169.07 
(121.62) 
𝑁 = 61 
171.93 
(109.29) 
𝑁 = 44 
170.27 
(116.08) 
𝑁 = 105 
0.6353 
2
0
0
4
 -
 2
0
0
8
 
AER 205.54 
(183.73) 
𝑁 = 24 
432.71 
(294.28) 
𝑁 = 7 
256.84 
(229.18) 
𝑁 = 31 
0.0170 
EE 138.66 
(72.10) 
𝑁 = 35 
130.52 
(104.34) 
𝑁 = 21 
135.61 
(84.79) 
𝑁 = 56 
0.2332 
both 165.86 
(132.41) 
𝑁 = 59 
206.07 
(212.29) 
𝑁 = 28 
178.80 
(162.26) 
𝑁 = 87 
0.8905 
2
0
0
9
 -
 2
0
1
3
 
AER 270.31 
(190.69) 
𝑁 = 16 
389.56 
(257.60) 
𝑁 = 16 
329.94 
(231.03) 
𝑁 = 32 
0.1458 
EE 162.86 
(79.42) 
𝑁 = 28 
217.24 
(129.07) 
𝑁 = 49 
197.47 
(116.00) 
𝑁 = 77 
0.0376 
both 201.93 
(139.21) 
𝑁 = 44 
259.66 
(183.42) 
𝑁 = 65 
236.36 
(168.71) 
𝑁 = 109 
0.0229 
2
0
1
4
 -
 2
0
1
8
 
AER 124.44 
(51.06) 
𝑁 = 9 
518.00 
(374.84) 
𝑁 = 4 
245.54 
(269.46) 
𝑁 = 13 
0.0699 
EE 208.00 
(110.17) 
𝑁 = 60 
245.89 
(126.28) 
𝑁 = 65 
227.70 
(119.86) 
𝑁 = 125 
0.0638 
both 197.10 
(107.90) 
𝑁 = 69 
261.67 
(159.09) 
𝑁 = 69 
229.38 
(139.25) 
𝑁 = 138 
0.0069 
Table 8: Mean values, standard deviations (in parentheses) and number of observations for number of total 
participants by period, region and journal. Last column is the p-value from a two-sided Mann-Whitney test. 
5.3 Ex Ante Proxies for a Paper's Quality 
Ex ante proxies represent information that is available before the paper is accepted for 
publication. Thus, such proxies can be used by referees and editors when deciding about 
whether to accept or reject a submitted paper. Our four proxies, P1 to P4, are such ex ante 
proxies. However, aspects like novelty, originality, and practical relevance are also available 
ex ante and important for a paper's quality. Attempting to account for such additional ex ante 
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proxies, we include three additional variables: the number of pages, the number of references, 
and authors’ reputation. When testing for editorial favoritism (in section 6), we will control for 
these variables. 
(P5) Consistent with the results of Medoff (2003) and Laband and Piette (1994a) we expect a 
positive correlation between the number of pages and quality. We assume that editors are 
willing to allocate more journal space to high quality papers. Since the journals have different 
formats and therefore different numbers of words per page, whenever necessary we converted 
the number of pages into EE-equivalent pages. 
(P6) We expect a positive correlation between the number of references and quality. We assume 
that authors who cite a larger number of references have studied a larger amount of related 
literature before conducting their own research. As we explain in subsection 5.4 below, we use 
citations received in the 5 and 10 years after publication of a paper as a proxy for the ex post 
quality. It seems plausible that a paper with a higher number of references also receives more 
attention from the scientific community than a paper with only a small number of references.  
(P7) As shown in Medoff (2003) and Laband and Piette (1994a) an author's reputation is likely 
to have a positive effect on the paper's quality. We proxy authors’ reputation by their stock of 
citations. In case of a single author, we take the total number of citations received by the author 
during the 5 years prior to the publication of the paper. In case of more than one author, we take 
the average of all authors' citations during the 5 years prior to the publication of the paper19. 
Editors could take a scholar's stock of prior citations as a signal of the expected scientific 
contribution of her paper (see Medoff 2003, 428-429)20. Also, it is conceivable that, regardless 
of the paper's quality, papers authored by well-known economists tend to attract more citations 
(Merton's Matthew effect, see Merton 1968). 
 
                                                     
19 The average number of authors increased significantly from the first period (1999-2003, mean: 2.30) to each of 
the three subsequent periods (2004-2008, mean: 2.54, 𝑝 = 0.034; 2009-2013, mean: 2.66, 𝑝 < 0.01; 2014-2018, 
mean: 2.53, 𝑝 = 0.024; p-values from two-sided Mann-Whitney tests). However, the increase is small and there 
are no significant differences in the average number of authors in the last three periods. We therefore assume that 
our measure of reputation is not distorted by changes in the average number of authors. 
20 This requires that editors can identify authors' identities despite the referee process being double blind. In a field 
experiment, Blank (1991) found that in AER's double blind referee process about 50% of referees could correctly 
identify the identity of authors. Given that many authors post preliminary versions of their papers online, we 
assume that in many cases, editors can also identify authors' identities. 
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5.4 Citations as Proxy for Ex Post Quality 
Ex post proxies measure the quality of a paper after its publication. We focus on just one proxy, 
citations21. This does not imply that citations reflect a paper's true quality. Rather, we decided 
to use the number of citations because data on citations is widely available and is heavily used 
to allocate positions and resources (Card and DellaVigna forthcoming, Hamermesh 2018, Moed 
2006, Laband and Piette 1994b). Moreover, assuming that it is a concern of the editors to 
maximize their journals' impact factor, they have an incentive to accept papers that they expect 
to receive a high number of citations. 
Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden. and Figure 2 show the distributions 
of citations received in the 5 and 10 years following publication by journal. Due to the small 
number of observations for the JEEA, we plot the distributions only for AER and EE (but see 
Table 9 for some descriptive statistics). The distributions are heavily skewed to the right. As one 
would expect, laboratory experiments published in the AER receive significantly more citations 
than laboratory experiments published in EE.  
 
Figure 1: Distribution of citations for laboratory experiments published in the AER, 5 and 10 years after 
publication. 
                                                     
21 Other ex post proxies are being reprinted in anthologies or the amount of media-coverage. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of citations for laboratory experiments published in EE, 5 and 10 years after publication. 
5.5 Are there Differences in Citations? 
Subsection 5.2 showed that North American and European experiments differ with respect to 
the total number of participants (P1) and the number of participants per treatment (P2). One 
might wonder whether this difference is associated with a difference in ex post quality, i.e., the 
number of citations. If there is a positive correlation between the total number of participants 
or the number of participants per treatment and the experiment's quality, one would expect that 
European experiments receive a higher number of citations on average.  
Table 9 and Table 10 show that laboratory experiments conducted in Europe receive more 
citations compared to laboratory experiments conducted in North America. For the 5-year 
period after publication, this holds for all three journals and for the 10-year period after 
publication this holds for papers published in the AER and EE. For JEEA, there are too few 
observations because JEEA started only in 2003. 
Most differences for mean values are statistically significant, and, more importantly, they are 
very large. For example, looking at citations in the 10 years after publication for experiments 
published in the AER, we see that European experiments received on average 124 citations 
while North American experiments received on average 61 citations. Since citations are heavily 
skewed to the right we also perform a test for differences in medians in Table 9 and Table 10. 
There are only significant differences in medians for citations received in the 5 years after 
publication for laboratory experiments published in the AER and EE. 
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citations five 
years after 
publication 
North America Europe both regions p-value 
AER mean 
median 
90%-p. 
sd 
N 
23.63 
17.00 
61.00 
(23.15) 
65 
38.62 
31.50 
82.00 
(34.82) 
34 
28.78 
20.00 
65.00 
(28.45) 
99 
0.0045 
0.034 
EE mean 
median 
90%-p. 
sd 
N 
6.20 
4.00 
15.50 
(7.87) 
80 
10.62 
6.00 
23.00 
(13.03) 
87 
8.50 
4.00 
17.00 
(11.06) 
167 
0.0039 
0.007 
 
JEEA mean 
median 
90%-p. 
sd 
N 
22.13 
12.50 
83.00 
(26.01) 
8 
29.00 
9.00 
160.00 
(50.10) 
9 
25.76 
12.00 
83.00 
(39.54) 
17 
0.7726 
0.797 
all 
three 
mean 
median 
90%-p. 
sd 
N 
14.44 
7.00 
36.00 
(19.08) 
153 
19.22 
10.50 
46.00 
(27.10) 
130 
16.63 
9.00 
40.00 
(23.19) 
283 
0.0696 
0.097 
Table 9: Mean values, medians, 90% percentiles, standard deviations (in parentheses) and number of observations 
for citations in the 5 years after publication (‘c5’) by region and journal. The upper (lower) row of the last column 
contains the p-values of a two-sample Mann-Whitney test (continuity corrected Pearson Chi-square test), 
comparing the distribution of c5 between North America and Europe.  
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citations ten 
years after 
publication 
North America Europe both regions p-value 
AER mean 
median 
90%-p. 
sd 
N 
61.28 
44.00 
128.00 
(75.44) 
43 
123.62 
101.00 
275.00 
(106.33) 
13 
75.75 
49.50 
171.00 
(86.71) 
56 
0.0170 
0.527 
EE mean 
median 
90%-p. 
sd 
N 
13.55 
9.00 
27.00 
(15.07) 
42 
33.57 
14.00 
88.00 
(45.69) 
23 
20.63 
11.00 
43.00 
(30.92) 
65 
0.0511 
0.541 
 
JEEA mean 
median 
90%-p. 
sd 
N 
8.00 
8.00 
8.00 
 
1 
31.50 
31.50 
46.00 
(20.51) 
2 
23.67 
17.00 
46.00 
(19.86) 
3 
not 
enough 
oberv. 
both mean 
median 
90%-p. 
sd 
N 
37.69 
19.00 
86.00 
(59.44) 
85 
66.08 
35.00 
176.00 
(84.34) 
36 
46.14 
21.00 
118.00 
(68.68) 
121 
0.0807 
0.311 
Table 10: Mean values, medians, 90% percentiles, standard deviations (in parentheses) and number of observations 
for citations in the 10 years after publication (‘c10’) by region and journal. The upper (lower) row of the last 
column contains the p-values of a two-sample Mann-Whitney test (continuity corrected Pearson Chi-square test), 
comparing the distribution of c10 between North America and Europe. 
6 Citations, Quality Proxies and Editorial Favoritism 
In this section, we examine whether the differences in citations are driven by differences in the 
quality proxies P1 to P7 or if they are indicative of editorial favoritism, which could result from 
the US dominance, as described in sections 4.1 and 4.2.  
6.1 Editorial Favoritism 
With regard to the quality proxies discussed in subsection 5.1, there is no reason to assume that 
clearly defined standards exist. Without such clearly defined standards, editors have a lot of 
leeway. Also, the proxies do not capture a paper's originality and relevance. Originality and 
relevance are highly subjective and might be unknown to editors when deciding about 
publication. This makes it possible that non-scientific criteria can have an influence on editors' 
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decisions, thus facilitating discrimination. Possibly, the US dominance itself even results from 
the behavior of editors, whose decisions are influenced by non-scientific criteria22. 
In order to see if there is editorial favoritism in experimental economics, we use an analysis 
similar to Medoff (2003) and Laband and Piette (1994a). Unlike Medoff (2003) and Laband 
and Piette (1994a), we do not focus on a single year of publication but a period of several years. 
In the existing literature (Colussi 2018, Brogaard et al. 2014, Medoff 2003, Laband and Piette 
1994a) there are multiple methods for measuring social ties. For our analysis we do not consider 
social ties between authors and editorial board members at the institutional level. Instead, our 
measure of social ties is the share of authors with a US affiliation23. More specifically, we test 
the hypothesis that for AER papers, the share of US-affiliated authors is negatively correlated 
with the number of citations. 
If confirmed, this would indicate that there is editorial favoritism in the AER. We hypothesize 
editorial favoritism for the AER, because almost all members of AER's editorial board are 
affiliated with a North American institution24. We do not hypothesize editorial favoritism for 
EE and the JEEA, because only half of their editorial boards consist of North American-
affiliated economists25. 
 
                                                     
22 Other reasons for the US dominance are mentioned in Frey and Pommerehne (1998). Firstly, the social and 
political conditions for research are very good in the US, leading to immigration of skilled researchers into the US. 
Secondly, the incentives for good research (in terms of publications in top journals) are very strong in the US. And 
thirdly, language. Papers published in a language other than English will rarely receive the same amount of 
attention like papers published in English because English is the lingua franca of economics. For economists whose 
native language is not English, publishing in English is associated with higher costs because one has to adopt 
language, style and format common in the US. We believe that these reasons have become weaker during the last 
years. 
23 Laband and Piette (1994a: 201) note that a broad range of social ties between editors and authors are not included 
in their analysis. Due to this fact and due to our long observation period, we are confident that our measure of 
social ties is suitable to show possible effects of editorial favoritism. 
24 AER's editorial board consists of 77 individuals, serving as editor, coeditor or board member. 72 individuals 
(93.50%) are affiliated with a North American-institution. Out of the five remaining individuals, three received 
their PhDs from US universities (https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/aer/about-aer/editors, accessed May 22, 2019). 
25 EE’s editorial board consists of 59 individuals, serving as editor, advisory editor or member of the editorial 
board. 28 individuals (47.46%) are affiliated with North American-institutions. The rest of the editorial board 
includes 23 individuals (38.98%) with a European affiliation, 6 individuals with an affiliation in Australia or New 
Zealand and one individual each with an affiliation in Asia or South America 
(https://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/10683?detailsPage=editorialBoard, accessed 
May 22, 2019). JEEA’s editorial board consists of 72 individuals, serving as editor, associate editor or member of 
the advisory board. 37 individuals are affiliated with a European institution, 34 individuals are affiliated with a 
North-American institution and one individual is affiliated with an institution in Asia 
(https://www.eeassoc.org/index.php?site=JEEA&page=175&trsz=45, accessed October 1, 2019). 
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In order to test our hypothesis, we use the following regression models. 
Models 1 and 4: 
𝑐𝑖(5, 10) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑇𝑖 + 𝛾5𝑃5𝑖 + 𝛾6𝑃6𝑖 + 𝛾7𝑃7𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖𝑃&𝑃𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖                (1) 
Models 2 and 5: 
𝑐𝑖(5, 10) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑇𝑖 + 𝛾1𝑃1𝑖+𝛾4𝑃4𝑖 + 𝛾5𝑃5𝑖 + 𝛾6𝑃6𝑖 + 𝛾7𝑃7𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖𝑃&𝑃𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖      (2) 
Models 3 and 6: 
𝑐𝑖(5, 10) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑇𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑃2𝑖 + 𝛾3  𝑃3𝑖+𝛾4𝑃4𝑖 + 𝛾5𝑃5𝑖 + 𝛾6𝑃6𝑖 + 𝛾7𝑃7𝑖 +
                      𝛿𝑖𝑃&𝑃𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖             (3) 
The independent variables 𝑐𝑖(5) and 𝑐𝑖(10) represent the total number of citations paper i 
received during the 5 or 10 years after publication. Because the number of citations is left-
censored by 0, we used Tobit regressions. Note that data on 𝑐𝑖(5) (𝑐𝑖(10)) is available only for 
papers published in 2013 (2008) or earlier. 
Our measure of social ties, 𝑆𝑇𝑖, is the relative share of US-affiliated authors for paper 𝑖
26. The 
coefficient 𝛽1 estimates the difference in quality (measured by the number of citations) between 
AER papers authored by scholars with and without a US-affiliation. In the presence of editorial 
favoritism, we expect 𝛽1 < 0. 
The paper's quality proxies number of pages (P5), number of references (P6) and authors’ 
reputation (P7) are included in each model specification. Models 1 and 4 include only these 
proxies. In models 2 and 5, we add the total number of participants (P1) and the strength of 
incentives (P4). In models 3 and 6, we add the number of participants per treatment (P2), the 
number of treatments (P3), and the strength of incentives (P4). Based on sections 5.1 and 5.3, 
we expect all proxies' coefficients to be positive. For the AER regressions, P&Pi is an indicator 
                                                     
26 This is different from Laband and Piette (1994a) and Medoff (2003) who focus on authors who received their 
PhDs from the same university the editor was affiliated with at the time of the publication. We focus on US versus 
non-US-affiliations because the AER has several rules that prevent editorial favoritism on the level of institutions. 
For example, "[c]oeditors are recused from papers involving current colleagues at the same institution (regardless 
of department), as well as graduate students at the same institution" (for all rules see: 
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/aer/about-aer/editorial-policy). We excluded papers (𝑁 = 7) reporting 
laboratory experiments conducted in the US by authors that do not have an affiliation in the US, because for these 
papers it is unclear whether a social tie exists. 
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variable for papers published in AER's Papers and Proceedings, which we include in models 1 
to 6. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 c5 c5 c5 c10 c10 c10 
Constant 18.75** 26.20 29.10 139.90*** 219.50*** 283.46*** 
 (8.60) (18.52) (20.99) (38.04) (68.00) (77.83) 
       
ST -7.70 -18.03* -19.86* -44.91* -101.30** -141.80*** 
 (5.45) (9.67) (10.26) (25.61) (35.77) (37.08) 
       
Experiment 
Quality 
      
P1  -0.01   -0.01  
(total nr. of part.)  (0.02)   (0.07)  
       
P2   -0.04   -0.20* 
(part. per treatm.)   (0.03)   (0.10) 
       
P3   -0.91   -3.37 
(treatments)   (1.61)   (8.09) 
       
P4  -2.70 -2.47  -18.85 -37.74 
(incentives)  (15.35) (15.84)  (45.24) (45.85) 
       
Paper Quality       
P5 -0.40 -0.17 -0.08 -2.16 -0.68 -0.50 
(pages) (0.28) (0.50) (0.52) (1.30) (2.33) (2.87) 
       
P6 0.64*** 0.50* 0.49* 0.60 -2.12 -2.67 
(references) (0.17) (0.28) (0.28) (0.90) (1.31) (1.60) 
       
P7 0.02** 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.26 
(reputation) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.24) (0.29) 
       
Papers&Proceed. -11.73 -8.35 -6.25 -67.22** -49.16 -60.06 
 (8.22) (17.79) (19.88) (29.34) (58.94) (62.62) 
N 118 61 59 70 26 25 
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.05 
Table 11: Tobit regressions of c(5) and c(10) on papers' and experiments'  quality proxies. AER papers. Standard 
errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Table 11 contains the regression results for papers published in the AER. Taking the number 
of citations in the 5 years after publication as a proxy for quality, we find a significant negative 
effect of social ties for models 2 and 3 (𝛽1 < 0). This suggests that papers from authors with 
stronger social ties (i.e., a larger share of US-affiliated authors) have a lower quality compared 
to papers from authors with affiliations outside the US. More precisely, 𝛽1 measures the 
difference in citations between a paper with solely US-affiliated authors and a paper without 
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any US-affiliated authors. Based on model 2, papers with solely US-affiliated authors receive 
18 citations less in the 5 years after publication. Model 3 predicts a similar effect. The results 
are even stronger when we take the number of citations in the 10 years after publication as a 
proxy for quality (models 4 to 6). On average, papers with solely US-affiliated authors receive 
between 45 and 142 citations less compared to papers without any US-affiliated authors27. 
This difference can be interpreted as indirect evidence for discrimination, which would indicate 
that a paper from a US-based author is accepted for publication when a higher-quality paper 
from an author with an affiliation outside the US is available. Of course, this only holds if high-
quality papers from authors without social ties to the editorial board were submitted and 
rejected, but given AER's rejection rate, we think that this is highly likely28. 
This, however, does not imply that editors consciously discriminate against authors from 
outside the US. Rather, it is possible that editors systematically mispredict the number of 
citations a paper will receive in the years following its publication (i.e., editors wrongly predict 
that papers authored by US-based economists receive more citations than they actually do). 
Nonetheless, if citations can be taken as a proxy for quality, this will slow down scientific 
progress, and editors will fail to maximize their journal's impact factor.  
6.2 How do the Quality Proxies of AER Papers Affect Citations? 
Regarding the proxies for experimental quality (P1 to P4), only the number of participants per 
treatment (P2) affects citations. For each model, the total number of participants (P1), the 
number of treatments (P3), and the strength of monetary incentives (P4) have no effect on the 
number of citations in the 5 or 10 years after publication. This does not imply that editors do 
not care about the experiments' quality proxies. Rather, it could be that there are minimum 
standards that have to be fulfilled in order to get published, but going beyond those standards 
does not increase experimental quality any further. In other words, the perceived quality of an 
                                                     
27 As a robustness check, we test how our results from subsections 6.1 to 6.3 change if we use another proxy for 
social ties (see Table 18 and Table 19 in the appendix). Instead of 𝑆𝑇𝑖  we introduce an indicator variable that takes 
a value of 1 if all experiments included in a paper have been carried out exclusively in the US. For models 2, 3, 5 
and 6 in Table 18 (AER) and for models 1, 2, 3 and 4 in Table 19 (EE) we see that experiments conducted in North 
America receive significantly fewer citations in the 5 and 10 years after publication. The results for the quality 
characteristics (P1 to P7) are qualitatively similar. 
28 In 2018, for example, only 5.85% of all submissions were accepted at the AER (Duflo 2019). Medoff (2003, 
427) discusses several reasons why it is problematic to infer a possible editorial favoritism from the acceptance 
rates of a journal. 
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experiment that has a sufficient number of treatments and sufficiently strong incentives might 
not increase by adding additional treatments or paying higher incentives. 
In model 6 in Table 11, the number of participants per treatment (P2) is statistically significant 
but negative – contrary to what we expected. Why should a paper's quality decrease when the 
number of participants per treatment increases? Finding a smaller effect requires an experiment 
with a larger number of participants per treatment. Thus, if there is an inverse relation between 
quality and effect size, possibly because smaller effects are perceived as less interesting, this 
could explain the negative effect. 
Next, we look at the paper's quality proxies (P5 to P7). The number of pages (P5) has no effect 
on citations. Taking the number of citations in the 5 years after publication as a proxy for 
quality, the number of references (P6) has a robust effect. Approximately 1.5 to 2 additional 
references yield one additional citation. Only in model 1, the author's reputation (P7) has a 
significant but small effect. For 50 citations an author has accumulated in the 5 years prior 
publication, the expected number of citations increases by 129. However, if we take citations in 
the 10 years after publication as dependent variable, the author's reputation has no effect. 
It seems that if the paper's quality proxies have any effects on citations, there are positive effects 
for citations during the 5 years after publication, but no effects for citations during the 10 years 
after publication. Possibly, the number of references (P6) and the author's reputation (P7) 
attract some attention to the paper, and this increased attention leads to more citations, but this 
effect vanishes as the paper grows older. 
6.3 How do the Quality Proxies of EE and JEEA Papers Affect Citations? 
In Table 12 and Table 13, we report the main results for papers published in EE and the JEEA 
respectively.  
  
                                                     
29 Note that our proxy for reputation (the number of citations an author has received in the 5 years before the 
paper's publication) is left-skewed (see Figure 3 and Figure 4 in the appendix). For AER-papers from North 
America (Europe), the median is 72 (88) and the mean is 138 (244). This reflects Merton's Matthew effect. Those 
who already have large number of citations receive more citations. 
32 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 c5 c5 c5 c10 c10 c10 
Constant 8.18*** 6.42* 5.53 31.57** 12.86 -2.77 
 (2.61) (3.32) (3.69) (12.85) (16.91) (17.35) 
       
ST -2.44 -1.88 -1.86 -10.80 -3.43 -10.89 
 (1.58) (1.72) (1.71) (7.32) (9.44) (9.11) 
       
Experiment 
Quality 
      
P1  0.00   0.08*  
(total nr. of part.)  (0.01)   (0.05)  
       
P2    0.00   0.06 
(part. per treatm.)   (0.02)   (0.15) 
       
P3   0.57   7.30*** 
(treatments)   (0.37)   (2.23) 
       
P4  4.20 2.73  18.00 23.01 
(incentives)  (4.45) (4.53)  (24.82) (23.13) 
       
Paper Quality       
P5 -0.44*** -0.43*** -0.44*** -1.24** -1.40* -1.01 
(pages) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.59) (0.69) (0.65) 
       
P6 0.27*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.57** 0.63* 0.50 
(references) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.28) (0.35) (0.33) 
       
P7 0.01*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03 0.08 0.04 
(reputation) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) 
N 201 138 138 84 50 50 
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.04 
Table 12: Tobit regressions of c(5) and c(10) on social ties and experiments' and papers’ quality proxies. EE papers. 
Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
As can be seen from Table 12, for EE papers the relative share of US-based authors (𝑆𝑇) has 
no significant effect on citations. The number of treatments (P3) has a positive effect on 
citations in the 10 years after publication. For each additional treatment, the expected number 
of citations increases by 7.30. The total number of participants (P1) has no effect on citations 
in the 5 years and a small positive effect on citations in the 10 years after publication. The 
number of participants per treatment (P2) and the strength of monetary incentives (P4) are not 
significant.  
The number of references (P6) has a small but positive effect on citations in the 5 and 10 years 
after publication. The author's reputation (P7) has a small positive effect, but only on citations 
in the 5 years after publication. Finally, papers with a higher number of pages (P5) tend to 
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receive fewer citations. Possibly, the non-significant effects of P1 to P4 stem from the fact that 
the distribution of citations in the 5 years after publication is much narrower for EE, compared 
to the AER and the JEEA (see Table 9).  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 c5 c5 c5 
Constant -5.49 19.06 -1.06 
 (23.50) (26.52) (44.81) 
    
ST 18.29 18.75 37.27 
 (25.82) (16.30) (29.68) 
    
Experiment 
Quality 
   
P1  0.17***  
(total nr. of part.)  (0.03)  
    
P2    0.55** 
(part. per treatm.)   (0.21) 
    
P3   4.64 
(treatments)   (3.53) 
    
P4  -68.10 -113.03 
(incentives)  (52.46) (77.11) 
    
Paper Quality    
P5 -1.40 -2.43*** -2.46** 
(pages) (1.01) (0.60) (0.98) 
    
P6 1.55** 0.99* 1.45 
(references) (0.67) (0.51) (0.79) 
    
P7 0.03 0.02* 0.03* 
(reputation) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
N 19 13 13 
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.19 0.11 
Table 13: Tobit regressions of c(5) on social ties and experiments' and papers’ quality proxies. JEEA papers. 
Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Table 13 shows that for papers published in the JEEA, the relative share of US-affiliated authors 
(𝑆𝑇) also has no significant effect on citations in the 5 years after publication. Note that Table 
13 only reports the results for models 1 to 3 because there are only three laboratory experiments 
for which we have data on the citations in the 10 years after publication. The total number of 
participants (P1) and the number of participants per treatment (P2) each have a positive effect. 
The number of treatments (P3) and the strength of monetary incentives (P4) are not significant.  
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For the JEEA the results for a papers’ quality (P5 to P7) are very similar to the results for EE. 
In models 1 and 2 the number of references (P6) has a positive effect on citations in the 5 after 
publication. For the JEEA this effect is more pronounced than for EE. For models 2 and 3 also 
the author's reputation (P7) has a small positive effect on citations and papers with a higher 
number of pages (P5) tend to receive fewer citations. 
Regarding the author’s reputation (P7) for EE and the JEEA our results are in line with the 
results of Medoff (2003) and Laband and Piette (1994a). However, our results differ regarding 
the number of pages (P5), since Medoff (2003) and Laband and Piette (1994a) find that longer 
papers increase the number of citations. 
6.4 Network Effects as an Alternative Explanation 
Differences in citation practices and network effects could be an alternative explanation for the 
significantly lower number of citations received by US-affiliated authors in the AER. The 
majority of experimental economists (about 58 %) are affiliated in Europe30. If they are more 
familiar with each other's work, this could lead to a high number of citations from European 
authors to other European authors. Put bluntly, most experimental economists are in Europe, 
and if they cite each other, this increases the number of citations received by European 
economist but not by non-European economists. This is in line with Frey and Pommerehne 
(1988, 107), who argue that economists may tend to cite economists from the same country 
more often for personal or professional reasons, or simply because they know them best. If true, 
citations are a biased measure of quality. Moreover, the results from Table 11 might not be 
driven by the composition of AER’s editorial board, but simply by network effects resulting 
from differences in citation practices and differences in the populations of experimental 
economists with a US- or European-affiliation.  
To test this alternative explanation, we look at where citations come from. We selected the most 
cited papers from our dataset31 that were authored solely by economists with a US- (16 papers) 
or European-affiliation (11 papers), and analyzed where their received citations come from. 
The results show that the US-affiliated authors received on average 38.72% of their citations 
                                                     
30 To get an idea of the total number of experimental economists in different regions, we checked the affiliations 
of all authors of the current RePEc list of authors in experimental economics (𝑁 = 1831). With 57.84%, more 
than half of all experimental economists on this list have a European affiliation, followed by economists with an 
affiliation in North America (30.20%), Asia (5.90%), Australia or New Zealand (3.82%), South America (1.86%) 
and Africa (0.38%). See, https://ideas.repec.org/i/eexp.html (accessed October 5, 2019). 
31 The criteria were that these papers received at least 40 (100) citations in the 5 (10) years after publication. 
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from North America, 50.42% of their citations from Europe, and 10.86% of their citations from 
the rest of the world. The respective numbers for the European-affiliated authors are 63.17% 
from Europe, 27.53% from North America and 9.31% from the rest of the world. 
The numbers for the European-affiliated authors thus almost match the geographical 
distribution of experimental economists on the RePEc list. Compared to the European-affiliated 
authors, the US-affiliated authors received a considerably lower share of their citations from 
Europe. This suggests that differences in citation practices and network effects that increase the 
citations of European-affiliated authors could at least partly drive our results. However, if 
differences in citation practices and network effects were solely responsible for our findings 
regarding ex post quality, we would expect a negative effect of social ties across all journals. 
As shown in Table 12 and Table 13, this is not the case. Moreover, the assumption that social 
ties between experimental economists in Europe are as strong as those between experimental 
economists in the US does not seem plausible. While the majority of US-affiliated authors are 
likely to be native English speakers, all of whom work within one country, our dataset for the 
European region includes authors with affiliations in 20 different countries. Only a few of the 
European-affiliated authors share the same mother tongue, and it is also likely that the 
European-affiliated authors will most frequently attend conferences and seminars at national 
level. For our dataset we therefore believe that social ties between US-affiliated authors are 
more pronounced than between European-affiliated authors. 
6.5 Limitations 
There are a number of limitations to our approach. First, we only collected data on laboratory 
experiments published in three journals. It is not clear whether a different journal selection 
would yield similar patterns on geographical concentration and the experiments' quality 
proxies. Despite the focus on three journals, we think that our results are noteworthy 
considering the ex ante and ex post quality differences between experiments conducted in North 
America and Europe. 
Second, for the collection of citation data we used Web of Science. Since Web of Science has 
not indexed all journals and literature sources, the citations of Web of Science  deviate from the 
citations counts by other platforms, e.g. Google Scholar32. For our data set we therefore do not 
                                                     
32 See Hamermesh (2018) for a detailed analysis of the relation between Web of Science and Google Scholar 
citations.  
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claim to have recorded all citations received by a paper in the years after its publication, or to 
have recorded all citations received by a single author in the 5 years prior publication of the 
respective paper. However, we do not regard this incomplete recording of citations as 
problematic, as it can be expected to introduce a level effect but not any systematic 
misrepresentations between authors.  
Third, when testing for editorial favoritism, our data set contains only a small number of 
laboratory experiments published in the AER. This implies that our results must be interpreted 
with caution. Our results are compatible with the existence of editorial favoritism, but they do 
not prove its existence (see section 6.4). And, of course, there is no reason to believe that our 
results, which are based exclusively on papers reporting results from laboratory experiments, 
carry over to other subfields of economics. In addition, in our test for editorial favoritism, we 
assume that editors have the primary goal of maximizing the impact factor of their journal and 
thus the number of citations that the published papers receive. However, we can neither be sure 
that this assumption is correct nor that other quality characteristics, such as relevance for policy-
making or expected media coverage, do not play a stronger role in the selection of papers. 
Finally, it should be noted that we only recorded authors’ affiliations at the time of publication. 
We have therefore not captured any social ties that existed due to previous employment, 
research or study stays. 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper, we examined geographical concentration, compared objectively measurable 
quality proxies and tested for editorial favoritism in experimental economics.  
We found that geographical concentration decreased. More precisely, the US's share in research 
output decreased from 65% to 47% while the shares of several European countries (Germany, 
the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK) and Australia increased. This is in line with other 
studies (Ek and Henrekson 2019, Kocher and Sutter 2001) that do not focus on any particular 
field but report a decreasing US dominance across fields. 
Looking more closely into the papers, we examine if four ex ante proxies for the quality of the 
experiments (total number of participants, participants per treatment, number of treatments 
and strength of monetary incentives) differ between journals.  
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Comparing experiments conducted in North America and Europe, there are no differences 
regarding the number of treatments and the strength of monetary incentives. However, 
European experiments rely on a significantly larger total number of participants and a 
significantly larger number of participants per treatment. This holds for all journals, but the 
difference is most pronounced for the AER, where, on average, experiments conducted in North 
America have 54 participants per treatment while experiments conducted in Europe have 111 
participants per treatment. 
The differences in the total number of participants and participants per treatment could reflect 
different methodological standards. However, they could also indicate substantial barriers to 
entry for European economists, especially at the AER, where the North American dominance 
is more pronounced in the composition of the editorial board. 
Analyzing the number of citations papers receive in the 5 and 10 years after publication, we 
find that experiments conducted in Europe receive more citations compared to experiments 
conducted in North America. The differences are statistically significant and large, except for 
papers published in the JEEA, possibly because of the small number of observations for this 
journal. In the 10 years after publication, North American AER papers receive, on average, 61 
citations while European AER papers receive, on average, 124 citations. For EE, the 
corresponding numbers are 14 and 34. 
Finally, we test for editorial favoritism. Editorial favoritism means that social ties (here: a vast 
majority of members of the editorial board and a positive share of authors having a US 
affiliation) have a negative effect on the quality of the published papers. We focus on the AER, 
where almost all members of the editorial board are affiliated with US universities.  
Our data provide some indications of editorial favoritism for the AER: papers authored by 
economists with a social tie to the editorial board receive between 18 (45) and 20 (142) fewer 
citations in the 5 (10) years after publication, compared to papers authored by economists 
without a social tie to the editorial board. Due to the higher number of experimental economists 
in Europe, network effects may at least partly drive these results. Nevertheless, network effects 
do not seem to be the whole explanation, since a positive share of US-affiliated authors of a 
paper has no negative effect on the citation counts of EE and JEEA papers. 
For AER papers, we find only small or no effects of the experiment's quality proxies on 
citations. This could be due to the small number of observations. The number of references has 
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a positive effect on citations in the 5 years but no respectively a negative effect on citations in 
the 10 years subsequent publication. For EE papers we find that the number of pages has a 
negative effect and that the number of references has a positive effect on citations in the 5 and 
10 years after publication. Further, for EE papers our results show that authors’ reputation has 
a positive effect on the number of citations only in the first 5 years after publication. 
As a concluding remark: we found that about one third of the papers reported incomplete 
information about their experimental procedures. This is of particular concern in view of the 
replication crisis in the social sciences. Only a well-documented experiment can be replicated. 
In addition, the statistical processing of individual results in meta-studies is hampered if, for 
example, it is not clear how many persons participated in an experiment. Future research would 
benefit from clearly defined standards that specify which characteristics of a laboratory 
experiment should be reported in a paper. 
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Appendix 
  
Shares 
Scores 
AER EE JEEA All three 
Argentinia 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.18 
 2.73 0.00 0.00 2.73 
Australia 2.42 3.80 2.32 3.20 
 12.37 33.62 3.32 49.31 
Austria 2.81 4.86 0.00 3.73 
 14.35 42.99 0.00 57.34 
Azerbaijan 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.08 
 0.00 1.29 0.00 1.29 
Belgium 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.04 
 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.60 
Canada 1.62 2.71 1.71 2.25 
 8.27 23.98 2.44 34.70 
China 2.64 1.07 0.00 1.49 
 13.48 9.42 0.00 22.90 
Colombia 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.17 
 0.00 2.54 0.00 2.54 
Czech Republic 0.32 0.12 0.00 0.18 
 1.66 1.07 0.00 2.73 
Denmark 0.19 0.65 0.00 0.44 
 0.97 5.76 0.00 6.72 
Finland 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.07 
 0.00 1.13 0.00 1.13 
France 0.69 3.03 3.28 2.28 
 3.53 26.80 4.69 35.03 
Germany 4.35 12.08 11.62 9.47 
 22.20 106.85 16.62 145.67 
Guatemala 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.09 
 0.00 1.42 0.00 1.42 
India 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.17 
 0.00 2.62 0.00 2.62 
Israel 1.59 0.84 0.00 1.01 
 8.12 7.46 0.00 15.58 
Italy 0.42 3.50 1.73 2.31 
 2.15 30.95 2.47 35.57 
Japan 0.29 1.21 0.00 0.79 
 1.49 10.74 0.00 12.23 
Latvia 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.07 
 0.00 1.11 0.00 1.11 
Luxembourg 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.06 
 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.92 
Mexico 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.11 
 0.00 1.69 0.00 1.69 
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Netherlands 3.15 4.68 8.21 4.50 
 16.12 41.36 11.75 69.23 
New Zealand 0.16 1.19 0.00 0.74 
 0.80 10.54 0.00 11.34 
Norway 0.58 0.68 7.05 1.24 
 2.94 6.00 10.09 19.03 
Portugal 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.26 
 0.00 4.01 0.00 4.01 
Russia 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.08 
 0.00 1.28 0.00 1.28 
Singapore 0.54 0.80 0.00 0.64 
 2.73 7.06 0.00 9.79 
South Korea 0.09 0.18 2.96 0.41 
 0.46 1.59 4.23 6.28 
Spain 2.87 5.88 2.28 4.55 
 14.64 52.05 3.26 69.95 
Sweden 0.76 1.25 0.00 0.97 
 3.89 11.06 0.00 14.95 
Switzerland 5.36 2.24 17.86 4.73 
 27.39 19.85 25.55 72.79 
Taiwan 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.14 
 0.00 2.18 0.00 2.18 
Turkey 0.32 0.09 0.00 0.16 
 1.61 0.81 0.00 2.42 
UK 5.79 8.80 10.61 7.97 
 29.60 77.89 15.18 122.68 
US 62.23 37.84 29.10 45.22 
 319.39 334.79 41.64 695.82 
UAE 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.08 
 0.00 1.27 0.00 1.27 
Uruguay 0.00 0.00 1.28 0.12 
 0.00 0.00 1.83 1.83 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 510.90 884.70 143.07 1538.68 
Table 14: Countries' shares and scores, all countries, pooled data from 1998 to 2018 for the AER, from 1999 to 
2018 for EE and from 2011 to 2018 for the JEEA. 
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Shares 
Scores 
1999-2003 2004-2008 2009-2013 2014-2018 1999-2018 
Argentinia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.19 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.73 2.73 
Australia 0.67 1.41 3.44 5.09 3.28 
 0.71 3.94 20.12 21.23 46.00 
Austria 0.63 0.12 6.79 3.99 4.09 
 0.67 0.34 39.71 16.63 57.34 
Azerbaijan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.09 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.29 1.29 
Belgium 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.04 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.60 
Canada 1.58 0.88 2.78 2.85 2.32 
 1.68 2.46 16.23 11.89 32.58 
China 1.22 1.06 0.38 3.94 1.63 
 1.29 2.95 2.23 16.42 22.90 
Colombia 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.46 0.18 
 0.00 0.00 0.64 1.90 2.54 
Czech Republic 0.00 0.59 0.00 0.26 0.19 
 0.00 1.66 0.00 1.07 2.73 
Denmark 0.00 0.15 0.28 1.13 0.48 
 0.00 0.41 1.61 4.71 6.72 
Finland 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.08 
 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.85 1.13 
France 3.01 0.20 2.61 2.72 2.16 
 3.18 0.55 15.27 11.33 30.33 
Germany 4.78 5.53 9.56 12.63 9.22 
 5.06 15.43 55.91 52.66 129.38 
Guatemala 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.10 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.42 1.42 
India 0.00 0.23 0.19 0.21 0.19 
 0.00 0.65 1.11 0.86 2.62 
Israel 1.07 0.78 1.79 0.44 1.18 
 1.13 2.18 10.44 1.82 16.58 
Italy 0.61 1.23 3.06 2.66 2.40 
 0.65 3.44 17.91 11.09 33.60 
Japan 0.61 1.10 0.57 1.24 0.87 
 0.65 3.07 3.36 5.16 12.23 
Latvia 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.08 
 0.00 0.00 1.11 0.00 1.11 
Luxembourg 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.07 
 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.92 
Mexico 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.20 0.12 
 0.00 0.00 0.85 0.83 1.69 
Netherlands 2.32 4.20 3.49 5.49 4.10 
 2.46 11.73 20.40 22.88 57.48 
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New Zealand 1.67 0.16 1.15 0.58 0.81 
 1.77 0.45 6.72 2.40 11.34 
Norway 0.00 1.05 0.00 1.44 0.64 
 0.00 2.94 0.00 6.00 8.94 
Portugal 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.67 0.29 
 0.00 0.00 1.23 2.78 4.01 
Russia 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.09 
 0.00 0.00 1.28 0.00 1.28 
Singapore 0.00 0.00 0.37 1.83 0.70 
 0.00 0.00 2.16 7.63 9.79 
South Korea 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.15 
 0.00 0.00 1.59 0.00 2.05 
Spain 1.70 2.81 8.46 1.82 4.78 
 1.80 7.85 49.46 7.59 67.02 
Sweden 1.01 1.70 0.23 1.86 1.07 
 1.07 4.74 1.37 7.76 14.95 
Switzerland 9.19 1.30 4.49 1.83 3.37 
 9.72 3.64 26.24 7.64 47.24 
Taiwan 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.20 0.16 
 0.00 1.34 0.00 0.83 2.18 
Turkey 1.52 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.17 
 1.61 0.00 0.81 0.00 2.42 
UK 3.07 6.53 9.23 7.69 7.77 
 3.25 18.24 53.93 32.08 109.00 
US 65.07 68.47 39.68 36.83 46.85 
 68.87 191.12 231.94 153.56 657.18 
UAE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.09 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.27 1.27 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 105.85 279.14 584.54 416.92 1402.61 
Table 15: Development of geographical concentration of AER and EE authors for all countries, data pooled over 
different periods. For each country, the first row reports the country's share and the second row reports the country's 
score. 
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Country I: Score 
II: Pop. (in 
1000) 
III: 
 
𝑰
𝑰𝑰
∗ 𝟏𝟎𝟔  
IV: Score 
V: Pop. (in 
1000) 
VI: 
 
𝑰𝑽
𝑽
∗ 𝟏𝟎𝟔  
Period 1999–2003 1999  2004-2008 2004  
Argentinia 0.00 36,648.1 0.00 0.00 38,728.7 0.00 
Australia 0.71 18,926.0 0.04 3.94 20,127.4 0.20 
Austria 0.67 7,992.3 0.08 0.34 8,172.0 0.04 
Azerbaijan 0.00 7,982.8 0.00 0.00 8,306.5 0.00 
Belgium 0.00 10,226.4 0.00 0.00 10,421.1 0.00 
Canada 1.68 30,499.2 0.05 2.46 31,995.0 0.08 
China 1.29 1,252,735.0 0.00 2.95 1,296,075.0 0.00 
Colombia 0.00 39,819.3 0.00 0.00 42,724.2 0.00 
Czech Rep. 0.00 10,283.9 0.00 1.66 10,197.1 0.16 
Denmark 0.00 5,321.8 0.00 0.41 5,404.5 0.08 
Finland 0.28 5,165.5 0.05 0.00 5,228.2 0.00 
France 3.18 60,496.7 0.05 0.55 62,704.9 0.01 
Germany 5.06 82,100.2 0.06 15.43 82,516.3 0.19 
Guatemala 0.00 11,387.2 0.00 0.00 12,796.9 0.00 
India 0.00 1,034,539.2 0.00 0.65 1,126,135.8 0.00 
Israel 1.13 6,125.0 0.19 2.18 6,809.0 0.32 
Italy 0.65 56,916.3 0.01 3.44 57,685.3 0.06 
Japan 0.65 126,631.0 0.01 3.07 127,761.0 0.02 
Latvia 0.00 2,390.5 0.00 0.00 2,263.1 0.00 
Luxembourg 0.00 430.5 0.00 0.00 458.1 0.00 
Mexico 0.00 100,300.6 0.00 0.00 106,995.6 0.00 
Netherlands 2.46 15,812.1 0.16 11.73 16,281.8 0.72 
New Zealand 1.77 3,835.1 0.46 0.45 4,087.5 0.11 
Norway 0.00 4,461.9 0.00 2.94 4,591.9 0.64 
Portugal 0.00 10,217.8 0.00 0.00 10,483.9 0.00 
Russia 0.00 147,214.4 0.00 0.00 144,067.1 0.00 
Singapore 0.00 3,958.7 0.00 0.00 4,166.7 0.00 
South Korea 0.00 46,616.7 0.00 0.00 48,082.5 0.00 
Spain 1.80 40,386.9 0.04 7.85 42,921.9 0.18 
Sweden 1.07 8,857.9 0.12 4.74 8,993.5 0.53 
Switzerland 9.72 7,144.9 1.36 3.64 7,389.6 0.49 
Taiwan 0.00 21,712.0 0.00 1.34 22,462.0 0.06 
Turkey 1.61 62,287.3 0.03 0.00 67,007.9 0.00 
UK 3.25 58,682.5 0.06 18.24 59,987.9 0.30 
US 68.87 279,040.0 0.25 191.12 292,805.3 0.65 
UAE 0.00 2,988.2 0.00 0.00 4,087.9 0.00 
Total 105.85   279.14   
Table 16: Scores for the geographical concentration of AER and EE authors per one million inhabitants. Data 
pooled for periods 1999-2003 and 2004-2008. 
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Country I: Score 
II: Pop. (in 
1000) 
III: 
 
𝑰
𝑰𝑰
∗ 𝟏𝟎𝟔 
IV: Score 
V: Pop. (in 
1000) 
VI: 
 
𝑰𝑽
𝑽
∗ 𝟏𝟎𝟔 
 Period 2009-2013 2009  2014-2018 2014  
Argentinia 0.00 40,799.4 0.00 2.73 42,981.5 0.06 
Australia 20.12 21,691.7 0.93 21.23 23,475.7 0.90 
Austria 39.71 8,343.3 4.76 16.63 8,546.4 1.95 
Azerbaijan 0.00 8,947.2 0.00 1.29 9,535.1 0.14 
Belgium 0.00 10,796.5 0.00 0.60 11,209.1 0.05 
Canada 16.23 33,628.6 0.48 11.89 35,535.3 0.33 
China 2.23 1,331,260.0 0.00 16.42 1,364,270.0 0.01 
Colombia 0.64 45,416.2 0.01 1.90 47,791.9 0.04 
Czech Rep. 0.00 10,443.9 0.00 1.07 10,525.3 0.10 
Denmark 1.61 5,523.1 0.29 4.71 5,643.5 0.83 
Finland 0.00 5,338.9 0.00 0.85 5,461.5 0.16 
France 15.27 64,707.0 0.24 11.33 66,316.1 0.17 
Germany 55.91 81,902.3 0.68 52.66 80,982.5 0.65 
Guatemala 0.00 14,316.12 0.00 1.42 15,923.6 0.09 
India 1.11 1,214,270.1 0.00 0.86 1,293,859.3 0.00 
Israel 10.44 7,485.6 1.39 1.82 8,215.7 0.22 
Italy 17.91 59,095.4 0.30 11.09 60,789.1 0.18 
Japan 3.36 128,047.0 0.03 5.16 127,276.0 0.04 
Latvia 1.11 2,141.7 0.52 0.00 1,993.8 0.00 
Luxembourg 0.92 497.8 1.85 0.00 556.3 0.00 
Mexico 0.85 115,505.2 0.01 0.83 124,221.6 0.01 
Netherlands 20.40 16,530.4 1.23 22.88 16,865.0 1.36 
New Zealand 6.72 4,302.6 1.56 2.40 4,509.7 0.53 
Norway 0.00 4,828.7 0.00 6.00 5,137.2 1.17 
Portugal 1.23 10,568.2 0.12 2.78 10,401.1 0.27 
Russia 1.28 142,785.3 0.01 0.00 143,819.7 0.00 
Singapore 2.16 4,987.6 0.43 7.63 5,469.7 1.40 
South Korea 1.59 49,307.8 0.03 0.00 50,746.7 0.00 
Spain 49.46 46,362.9 1.07 7.59 46,480.9 0.16 
Sweden 1.37 9,298.5 0.15 7.76 9,696.1 0.80 
Switzerland 26.24 7,743.8 3.39 7.64 8,188.7 0.93 
Taiwan 0.00 23,017.0 0.00 0.83 23,414.0 0.04 
Turkey 0.81 71,339.2 0.01 0.00 77,030.7 0.00 
UK 53.93 62,276.3 0.87 32.08 64,613.2 0.50 
US 231.94 306,771.5 0.76 153.56 318,386.4 0.48 
UAE 0.00 7,666.4 0.00 1.27 9,070.9 0.14 
Total 584.54   416.92   
Table 17: Scores for the geographical concentration of AER and EE authors per one million inhabitants. Data 
pooled for periods 2009-2013 and 2014-2018.  
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Figure 3: Distribution of citations received 5 years prior publication, for AER authors and experiments conducted 
in North America or Europe. 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of citations received 5 years prior publication, for EE authors and experiments conducted in 
North America or Europe. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 c5 c5 c5 c10 c10 c10 
Constant 15.77** 22.50 25.09 115.74*** 156.46** 167.31** 
 (7.94) (17.60) (19.79) (32.85) (62.47) (71.46) 
       
North America -5.06 -15.52** -17.02** -24.17 -59.56** -76.03** 
 (4.39) (7.54) (8.07) (18.69) (27.33) (28.99) 
       
Experiment 
Quality 
      
P1  -0.01   0.02  
(total nr. of part.)  (0.02)   (0.08)  
       
P2    -0.03   -0.14 
(part. per treatm.)   (0.03)   (0.11) 
       
P3   -0.64   -5.59 
(treatments)   (1.53)   (9.34) 
       
P4  -1.21 -1.42  10.56 7.85 
(incentives)  (15.10) (15.60)  (45.03) (47.42) 
       
Paper Quality       
P5 -0.39 -0.25 -0.16 -2.00 -0.06 1.54 
(pages) (0.28) (0.49) (0.51) (1.31) (2.45) (3.11) 
       
P6 0.65*** 0.54* 0.52* 0.67 -2.00 -1.94 
(references) (0.17) (0.27) (0.28) (0.91) (1.38) (1.78) 
       
P7 0.02** 0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.04 
(reputation) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.24) (0.30) 
       
Papers&Proceed. -12.46 -9.28 -5.90 -69.30** -37.83 -15.80 
 (8.22) (17.66) (19.76) (29.80) (61.74) (68.05) 
N 118 61 59 70 26 25 
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 
Table 18: Tobit regressions of c(5) and c(10) on place of experimentation, experiments' and papers' quality 
characteristics. Only AER papers. Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 c5 c5 c5 c10 c10 c10 
Constant 8.30*** 7.20** 6.34* 30.81** 14.74 -1.75 
 (2.60) (3.32) (3.70) (12.45) (16.59) (17.28) 
       
North America -2.71* -2.91* -2.73* -11.25* -10.23 -10.78 
 (1.50) (1.61) (1.60) (6.29) (7.88) (7.34) 
       
Experiment 
Quality 
      
P1  0.00   0.07  
(total nr. of part.)  (0.01)   (0.04)  
       
P2    0.00   0.07 
(part. per treatm.)   (0.02)   (0.15) 
       
P3   0.51   6.69*** 
(treatments)   (0.37)   (2.15) 
       
P4       
(incentives)  4.35 3.04  22.95 25.08 
  (4.42) (4.50)  (24.64) (23.11) 
Paper Quality       
P5 -0.44*** -0.44*** -0.45*** -1.22** -1.33* -1.09* 
(pages) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.59) (0.67) (0.63) 
       
P6 0.27*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.56** 0.55 0.50 
(references) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.28) (0.34) (0.32) 
       
P7 0.01** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03 0.08 0.04 
(reputation) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) 
N 201 138 138 84 50 50 
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.04 
Table 19: Tobit regressions of c(5) and c(10) on place of experimentation, experiments' and papers' quality 
characteristics. Only EE papers. Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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